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. For if the universals are always more of the nature
of principles, evidently the uppermost of the genera are the
principles; for these are predicated of all things. There will,
then, be as many principles of things as there are primary genera,
so that both being and unity will be principles and substances; for
these are most of all predicated of all existing things. But it is not
possible that either unity or being should be a single genus of
things; for the differentiae of any genus must each of them both
have being and be one, but it is not possible for the genus taken
apart from its species (any more than for the species of the genus) to
be predicated of its proper differentiae; so that if unity or being is
a genus, no differentia will either have being or be one. But if unity
and being are not genera, neither will they be principles, if the
genera are the principles. Again, the intermediate kinds, in whose
nature the differentiae are included, will on this theory be genera,
down to the indivisible species; but as it is, some are thought to
be genera and others are not thought to be so. Besides this, the
differentiae are principles even more than the genera; and if these
also are principles, there comes to be practically an infinite
number of principles, especially if we suppose the highest genus to be
a principle.-But again, if unity is more of the nature of a principle,
and the indivisible is one, and everything indivisible is so either in
quantity or in species, and that which is so in species is the
prior, and genera are divisible into species for man is not the
genus of individual men), that which is predicated directly of the
individuals will have more unity
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