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.-Further, in the case of things in
which the distinction of prior and posterior is present, that which is
predicable of these things cannot be something apart from them (e.g.
if two is the first of numbers, there will not be a Number apart
from the kinds of numbers; and similarly there will not be a Figure
apart from the kinds of figures; and if the genera of these things
do not exist apart from the species, the genera of other things will
scarcely do so; for genera of these things are thought to exist if any
do). But among the individuals one is not prior and another posterior.
Further, where one thing is better and another worse, the better is
always prior; so that of these also no genus can exist. From these
considerations, then, the species predicated of individuals seem to be
principles rather than the genera. But again, it is not easy to say in
what sense these are to be taken as principles. For the principle or
cause must exist alongside of the things of which it is the principle,
and must be capable of existing in separation from them; but for
what reason should we suppose any such thing to exist alongside of the
individual, except that it is predicated universally and of all? But
if this is the reason, the things that are more universal must be
supposed to be more of the nature of principles; so that the highest
genera would be the principles.
4
(8) There is a difficulty connected with these, the hardest of all
and the most necessary to examine, and of this the discussion now
awaits us
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