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. Hence to investigate all the
species of being qua being is the work of a science which is
generically one, and to investigate the several species is the work of
the specific parts of the science.
If, now, being and unity are the same and are one thing in the
sense that they are implied in one another as principle and cause are,
not in the sense that they are explained by the same definition
(though it makes no difference even if we suppose them to be like
that-in fact this would even strengthen our case); for 'one man' and
'man' are the same thing, and so are 'existent man' and 'man', and the
doubling of the words in 'one man and one existent man' does not
express anything different (it is clear that the two things are not
separated either in coming to be or in ceasing to be); and similarly
'one existent man' adds nothing to 'existent man', and that it is
obvious that the addition in these cases means the same thing, and
unity is nothing apart from being; and if, further, the substance of
each thing is one in no merely accidental way, and similarly is from
its very nature something that is:-all this being so, there must be
exactly as many species of being as of unity. And to investigate the
essence of these is the work of a science which is generically one-I
mean, for instance, the discussion of the same and the similar and the
other concepts of this sort; and nearly all contraries may be referred
to this origin; let us take them as having been investigated in the
'Selection of Contraries'
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