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Further, does it deal with substances only or also with their
attributes? If in the case of attributes demonstration is possible, in
that of substances it is not. But if the two sciences are different,
what is each of them and which is Wisdom? If we think of it as
demonstrative, the science of the attributes is Wisdom, but if as
dealing with what is primary, the science of substances claims the
tide.
But again the science we are looking for must not be supposed to
deal with the causes which have been mentioned in the Physics. For (A)
it does not deal with the final cause (for that is the nature of the
good, and this is found in the field of action and movement; and it is
the first mover-for that is the nature of the end-but in the case of
things unmovable there is nothing that moved them first), and (B) in
general it is hard to say whether perchance the science we are now
looking for deals with perceptible substances or not with them, but
with certain others. If with others, it must deal either with the
Forms or with the objects of mathematics. Now (a) evidently the
Forms do not exist. (But it is hard to say, even if one suppose them
to exist, why in the world the same is not true of the other things of
which there are Forms, as of the objects of mathematics. I mean that
these thinkers place the objects of mathematics between the Forms
and perceptible things, as a kind of third set of things apart both
from the Forms and from the things in this world; but there is not a
third man or horse besides the ideal and the individuals
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