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. The characteristics,
then, in respect of which and in direct consequence of which one thing
is perishable and another imperishable, are opposite, so that the
things must be different in kind.
Evidently, then, there cannot be Forms such as some maintain,
for then one man would be perishable and another imperishable. Yet the
Forms are said to be the same in form with the individuals and not
merely to have the same name; but things which differ in kind are
farther apart than those which differ in form.
Book XI
1
THAT Wisdom is a science of first principles is evident from the
introductory chapters, in which we have raised objections to the
statements of others about the first principles; but one might ask the
question whether Wisdom is to be conceived as one science or as
several. If as one, it may be objected that one science always deals
with contraries, but the first principles are not contrary. If it is
not one, what sort of sciences are those with which it is to be
identified?
Further, is it the business of one science, or of more than one,
to examine the first principles of demonstration? If of one, why of
this rather than of any other? If of more, what sort of sciences
must these be said to be?
Further, does Wisdom investigate all substances or not? If not
all, it is hard to say which; but if, being one, it investigates
them all, it is doubtful how the same science can embrace several
subject-matters
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