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. The concrete thing is other, but not other in species,
because in the definition there is no contrariety. This is the
ultimate indivisible kind. Callias is definition + matter, the pale
man, then, is so also, because it is the individual Callias that is
pale; man, then, is pale only incidentally. Neither do a brazen and
a wooden circle, then, differ in species; and if a brazen triangle and
a wooden circle differ in species, it is not because of the matter,
but because there is a contrariety in the definition. But does the
matter not make things other in species, when it is other in a certain
way, or is there a sense in which it does? For why is this horse other
than this man in species, although their matter is included with their
definitions? Doubtless because there is a contrariety in the
definition. For while there is a contrariety also between pale man and
dark horse, and it is a contrariety in species, it does not depend
on the paleness of the one and the darkness of the other, since even
if both had been pale, yet they would have been other in species.
But male and female, while they are modifications peculiar to
'animal', are so not in virtue of its essence but in the matter, ie.
the body. This is why the same seed becomes female or male by being
acted on in a certain way. We have stated, then, what it is to be
other in species, and why some things differ in species and others
do not
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