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. Further, how are we to suppose
that there is a substance of unity and the point? Every substance
comes into being by a gradual process, but a point does not; for the
point is a division.
A further difficulty is raised by the fact that all knowledge is
of universals and of the 'such', but substance is not a universal, but
is rather a 'this'-a separable thing, so that if there is knowledge
about the first principles, the question arises, how are we to suppose
the first principle to be substance?
Further, is there anything apart from the concrete thing (by which
I mean the matter and that which is joined with it), or not? If not,
we are met by the objection that all things that are in matter are
perishable. But if there is something, it must be the form or shape.
Now it is hard to determine in which cases this exists apart and in
which it does not; for in some cases the form is evidently not
separable, e.g. in the case of a house.
Further, are the principles the same in kind or in number? If they
are one in number, all things will be the same.
3
Since the science of the philosopher treats of being qua being
universally and not in respect of a part of it, and 'being' has many
senses and is not used in one only, it follows that if the word is
used equivocally and in virtue of nothing common to its various
uses, being does not fall under one science (for the meanings of an
equivocal term do not form one genus); but if the word is used in
virtue of something common, being will fall under one science
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